Nicomachean Ethics
Introduction
by Hye-Kyung Kim
^written or dictated 2500 years ago (500 BCE)
...ethics is the art of living well -- the art of human flourishing...but an individual cannot live well or flourish except in the context of the state. Ethics for [Aristotle] is a branch of politics. [Teleological or purpose or end-driven.]
Aristotle's is an ethics not of principles and rules, but of character, character development, proper deportment, proper and appropriate relations to others, and proper feeling. His guiding idea is not "breaking or keeping the law" but "being or not being the best possible person" It is in a certain sense, an ethics of self-development and duties to oneself figures prominently in it...The demands of ethics and the demands of proper prudence or self-interest do not conflict.
Happiness - according to A is the activity of the soul in accordance with Virtue [Arete]. In Hellenistic Greece Happiness isn't so much a subjective state but an "objective state of affairs"
Q:To Aristotle, the question is, "what is the virtue of man?"
Moral Virtue: living rationally by employing our intelligence to make plans, deliberate about which actions to perform, to our control emotions, to think about things,
and to understand reality. (courage, temperance, greatness of soul, gentleness,
truthfulness, wittiness, friendliness, righteous indignation and justice)
Intellectual Virtue: The intellect, in pursuing and contemplating the truth of what is necessary
and universal, and of what is appropriate in particular circumstances, is both unique to
humans and the highest or best faculty of human beings. The intellect is the best part of the soul...
since the intellect posseses its own excellence, its virtue is the highest virtue. The crowning
achievement of the good life is thus contemplation.
Friendship: Can be of different kinds depending on the aim or object of the friendship.
Three are especially important for [A]: pleasure, utility, and goodness. The first two are only
accidental friendships, according to him, for they are unstable and easily fall apart. [See Jaeger for
detail on the third kind: "kalos"]
A friend is a second-self; the relation of a person and his friend is very similar to the
relation a good man has to himself. Friends pursue the same ends--good ends--for
their own sake, and would not change who they are even if they could. A good man
is pleased to live with himself, as are friends with each other.
...the self is extended beyond one's own body, and so the happiness or misery of
another becomes one's own.
Pleasure: an ethics of virtue (not principle), and a virtuous person does not just feel the
right way, and do the right thing, at the right time, at the right place, to the right extent; he
also takes pleasure in virtuous action.
Pleasure...isn't the end or purpose of virtuous activity--virtuous activity is engaged
for its own sake-- and virtuous activity without pleasure is impossible.
Book I: The End
It seems that men not unreasonably take their notions of the good or happiness from the lives actually led, and that the masses who are the least refined suppose it to be pleasure, which is the reason why they aim at nothing higher than the life of enjoyment. For the most conspicuous kinds of life are three: This life of enjoyment, the life of a statesman, and the contemplative life.
If then there be one end of all that man does, this end will be the realizable good, or these ends, if there be more than one.
We see that there are many ends...Happiness sems more than anything else to answer this description: for we always choose it for itself, and never for the sake of something else; while honor, pleasure and reason, and all virtue or excellence, we choose partly for themselves.
The final good is thought to be self-sufficing. ...to mean what by itself makes life desirable and in want of nothing.
Thus it seems that happiness is something final and self-sufficing, and is the end of all that man does.
What is the function of man? For as the goodness and excellence [of an artisan]...lies in that function [its subject's virtue], so man's good would seem to lie in his function, if he has one.
The function of man, then, is exercise of his vital faculties [or soul] on one side and obedience to reason, and on the other side with reason.
The good man's function is to do this well and beautifully (or nobly). But the function of anything is done well when it is done in accordance with teh proper excellence of that thing.
If this be so the result is that the food of man is exercise of his faculties in accordance with excellence or virtue, or, if there be more than one, in accordance with the best and most complete virtue.
The happy man...will have this required property of permanence, and all through life will preserve his character; for he will be occupied continually, or with the least possible interruption, in excellent deeds and excellent speculations; and whatever his fortune be, he will take it in the noblest fashion, and bear himself always and in all things suitably, since he is truly good and "foursquare without flaw".
The virtue of excellence that we are to consider is, of course, the excellence of man; for it is the good of man and the happiness of man that we started to seek. And by the excellence of man I mean excellence not of body, but of soul; for happiness we take to be an activity of the soul.
Two parts of the soul are distinguished, and irrational and a rational part.
The irrational part...is twofold. There is the vegetative faculty, which has not share or reason; and the faculty of appetite or of desire in general.
The rational part also has two divisions: on rational in the strict sense as possessing reason itself, the other rational as listening to reason as a man listens to his father.
When we are speaking of a man's moral character we do not say that he is wise or intelligent, but that he is gentle or temperate. But we praise the wise man...for his habit of mind or trained faculty; and a habit or trained faculty that is praiseworthy is what we call an excellence or a virtue.
Book II: Moral Virtue
Intellectual excellence owes its birtth and growth mainly to instruction, and so requires time and experience, while moral excellence is the result of habit or custom [Ethos?]
The virtues come neither by nature nor against nature, but nature gives the capacity for acquiring them, and is developed by training.
Moral virtue or excellence is closely concerned with pleasure or pain. It is pleasure that moves us to do what is base, and pain is what moves us to refrain from what is noble. ...It has to do with actions and passions or affections; but every affection and every act is accompanied by pleasure or pain.
...virtue, like art, is always more concerned with what is harder; for the harder the task the better is the success.
[But] virtues are not [completely] analogous to the arts. The products of art of their excellence in themselves, and so it is enough of when produced they are of a certain quality, but but in the case of virtues, a man is not said to act justly or temperately...he must also be in a certain state of mind when he does it.
We next have to inquire what excellence or virtue is.
A quality of the soul is either 1.) a passion or emotion, or 2) a power or faculty, or 3) a habit or trained faculty; and so virtue must be one of these three.
The virtues are not emotions, nor are the vices. 1) because we are not called good or bad in respect of our emotions, but are called so in respect of our virtues or vices; 2) because we are neither praised nor blamed in respect of our emotions...3) because we may be angered or frightened without deliberate choice, but the virtues are a kind of deliberate choice, or at least are impossible without it; and 4) because in respect of our emotions we are said to be moved, but in respect of our virtues and vices we are not said to be moved, but to be regulated or disposed in this way or that.
...the master of any art avoids what is too much and what is too little, and seeks for the mean and chooses it--not the absolute but the relative mean.
And if virtue, like nature, is more exact and better than any art, it follows that virtue also must aim at the mean--virtue of course meaning moreal virtue or excellence; for it has to do with passions and actions.
Virtue...has to deal with feelings or passions and with outward acts, in which excess is wrong and deficiency also is blamed, but the mean amount is praised and right--and both of which are characteristics of virtue.
Virtue is a moderation or middle state, but viewed in its relation to what is best and right it is the extreme of perfection.
Book III: Moral Virtue 2
[example] Courage...is observance of the mean with regard to things that excite confidence and fear...and chooses its course ad sticks to its post because it is noble to do so, or because it is disgraceful not to do so. "the courageous are keen in action, but quiet enough beforehand."
There are five kinds of courage:
- Political Courage: most resembles true courage...because its impulse is a virtuous one.
- unnamed: experience in this or that matter is sometimes thought to be a sort of courage; and this indeed is the ground of the Socratic notion that courage is knowledge.
- Rage: [think wrath of Achilles] The truly courageous man is moved to act by what is noble, rage helpiong him: beasts are moved by pain. And so beasts are not courageous, since it is pain and rage that drives them to rush on danger. Being driven to face danger by rage or pain is not courage proper...when deliberate purpose and the right motive are added to it, to become real courage.
- Pride: The sanguine man is not properly called courageous: he is confident in danger because he has often won and has defeated many adversaries. The sanguine man is confident because he thinks he is superior and will win without receiving a scratch.
- pseudo-pride: similar to the sanguine man yet inferior in that they have not necessarily any opinion of themselves...
Courage is concerned with feelings both of confidence and of fear, yet it is not equally concerned with both, but more with occasions of fear: it is the man who is cool and behaves as he ought on such occasions that is called courageous, rather than he who behaves thus on occasions that inspire confidence.
...the more [man] is endowed with every virtue, adn the happier he is, the more grievous will death be to him; for life is more worth living to a man of his sort than to any one else, and he deprives himself knowingly of the very best thins; and it is painful to do that. But he is no less courageous because he feels this pain; nay we may say he is even more courageous becuase in spite of it he chooses noble conduct in battle in preference to those good things.
Courage and Temperance: Virtues related to the irrational parts of our nature.
Temperance (profligacy in the excess) will be concerned with the pleasures of the body [touch and taste]...and have to do with those kinds of pleasure which are common to the lower animals, for which they seem to be slavish and brutal.
The profligate desires all pleasant things or those that are most intensely pleasant, and is led by his desire so as to choose these in preference to all other things. And so he is constantly pained by failing to get them and by lusting after them: for all appetite involves pain; but it seems a strange thing to be pained for the sake of pleasure.
Book IV: Moral Virtue 3
Liberality...moderation in the matter of wealth.
- illiberality(deficient)<---------------->liberality<------------------->prodigality(excess)
- illiberality: excessive in taking; deficient in giving; rightly called the opposite of liberality; for it is a worse evil than prodigality, and men ar re more apt to err in this way than in [prodigality]
Liberality being moderation in the giving and taking of wealth, the liberal man will give and spend the proper amount on the proper objects, alike in small things and in great, and that with pleasure; and will also take the proper amount from the proper sources.
Magnificence: suitable expenditure on a large scale. For the magnificence man is liberal, but a man may be liberal without being magnificent.
- meanness(deficient)<---------------->magnificence<------------------->vulgarity(excess)
Excellence of a possession is not the same as the excellence of a product or work of art, that is most estimable which is great and beautiful: for the sight of such work excites admiration, and a magnificent thing is always admirable; indeed excellence of work on a great scale is magnificence.
High-mindedness: one who claims much and deserves much: for he who claims much without deserving it is a fool; but the possessor of virtue is never foolish or silly.
- temperate(deficient)<---------------->high-mindedness<------------------->;vain(excess)
Honors and dishonors are the field in which the high-minded man behaves as he ought...The high-minded man, as he deserves the greatest things, must be a perfectly good or excellent man; for the better man always deserves greater things, and the best possible man the greatest possible things. The really high-minded man must be a good or excellent man. High-mindedness seems to be the crowning grace of the virtues.
The high-minded man exhibits the character especially in matters of honors and dishonors and at great honor from good men he will be moderately pleased, as getting nothing more than his due...for no honor can be adequate to complete virtue.
And so high-minded men seem to look down upon everything.
...the do not exhibit virtue in their acts, but they look down upon others. For the high-minded man never looks down upon others without justice (for he estimates them correctly), while most men do so for quite irrelevant reasons. [he] is not quick to run into petty dangers.
It is his nature to confer benefits, but he is ashamed to receive them; for the former is part of the superior, the latter of an inferior.
It is his nature to confer benefits, but he is ashamed to receive them; for the former is part of the superior, the latter of an inferior.
It is characteristic of the high-minded man, again, never or reluctantly to ask favors, but to be ready to confer them, and to be lofy in his behavior to those who are high in station and favored by fortune, but affable to those of middle ranks; for it is a difficult thing and a dignified thing to assert superiority over the fformer, but easy to assert it over the latter. A haughty demeanor in dealing with the great is quite consistent with good breeding, but in dealing with those of low estate is brutal, like showing off ones' strength upon a cripple.
[he is not] easily moved to admiration; for nothing is great to him. He readily forgets injuries; for it is not consistent with his character to brood on the past...but rather to over look them...and so he is not apt to speak evil of others, not even of his enemies, except with the express purpose of giving offence.
When an event happens that cannot be helped or is of slight importance, he is the last man in the world to cry out or to beg for help; for that is the conduct of a man who thinks these events very important.
He loves to possess beautiful things that bring no profit, rather than useful things that pay; for this is the characteristic of the man whose resources are in himself.
the character of the high-minded man seems to require that his gait should be slow, his voice deep, his speech measured; for a man is not likely to be in a hurry...
Book V: Moral Virtue - Concluded, Justice
Justice: how many different senses we call a man unjust.
- he who breaks the law
- he who takes more than his fair share
A just thing will be 1) that which is in accordance with the law, 2) that which is fair
The unjust thing will be 1) that which is contrary to law, 2) that which is unfair.
Justice then is complete virtue, with the addition that it is displayed toward others. Justice sums up all virtues in itself.
It is complete virtue because it is the exhibition of complete virtue: it is also complete because he that has it is able to exhibit virtue in dealing with his neighbors, and not merely in his private affairs; for there are many who can be virtuous enough at home, but fair in dealing with their neighbors.
Justice in this sense of the word is not a part of virtue, but the whole of it; and the injustice which is opposed to it is not a part of vice but the whole of it.
How virtue differs from justice in this sense is plain from what we have said; it is one and the same character differently viewed: viewed in relation to others, this character is justice; viewed simply as a certain character, it is virtue.
But the acts which tend to produce complete virtue are those of the acts according to law which are prescribed with reference to the education of man as a citizen.
Justice lastly implies persons who participate in those things that are good, but who can have too much or too little of them. Justice is essentially human.
equity/equitable and how it relates to justice/that which is just.
What is just and what is equitable are generically the same, and both are good, though what is equitable is better.
But what obscures the matter is that though what is equitable is just, it is not identical with, but a correction of, that which is just according to law.
The reason for this that every law is laid down in general terms, while there are matters about which it is impossible to speak in general terms. Where, then, it is necessary to speak in general terms, but impossible to do so correctly, the legislator lays down that which holds good for the majority of cases, being quite aware that it does not hold good for all.
This defect lies not in the law, nor in the lawgiver, but in the nature of the subject-matter, being necessarily involved in the conditions of human action.What is equitable then is just, and better than what is just in one sense of the word--not better than absolutely just, but better than that which fails through its lack of qualification. And the essence of what is equitable is that it is an amendment of the law, in those points where it fails through the generality of its language.
Book VI: The Intellectual Values
The soul consists of two parts, the rational and the irrational part. There are two rational faculties. 1) that by which we know those things that depend on invariable principles [scientific or demonstrative], 2) that by which we know those things that are variable [calculative or deliberative].
Now the faculties which guide us in action and in the apprehension of truth are three: sense, reason (nous), and desire.
Moral virtue is a habit or formed faculty of choice or purpose, and purpose is desire following upon deliberation.
It follows that if purpose is to be all it should be, both the calculation or reasoning must be true and the desire right, and that the very same things must be assented to by the former and pursued by the latter.
Purpose is the cause -- not the final but the efficient cause or origin-- of action, and the origin of purpose is desire and calculation of means.
Mere reasoning, however, can never set anything going, but only reasoning about means to an end--what may be called practical reasoning.
Purpose may be called either a reason that desires, or a desire that reasons; and this faculty of originating action constitutes a man.
both divisions of the reason, or both the intellectual faculties have the attainment of truth for their function.
Let us assume that the modes in which the mind arrives at truth in the way of affirmation or negation are five in number:
***The habit or formed faculty of acting with reason or calculation is different from the formed faculty of producing with reason or calculation.
Art may be described as a certain formed faculty of producing with [correct] calculation. And every art is concerned with bringing something into being...and the cause of whose production lies in the producer, not in the thing itself which is produced. [It] is a certain formed faculty or habit of production with correct reasoning or calculation, and the contrary of this is a habit of production with incorrect calculation.
Prudence [is the ability] to deliberate well about what is good or expedient...not with a view to some particular end, but with a view to well-being living well. It can be neither science nor art because the sphere of action is alterable [non-science]; and the production is generically different from action [non-art].
...is a formed faculty that apprehends truth by reasoning or calculation, and issues in action, in the domain of good and ill [good action being in itself the end and not an art].
Temperance preserves prudence...For the principles of practice [for the causes which originate action] are the ends for the sake which acts are done; but wehen a man is corrupted by pleasure or pain, he straightaway loses sight of the principle, and no longer sees that this is the end for the sake of which, and as a means to which, each particular act should be chosen and done; for vice is apt to obliterate the principle.
Purpose may be called either a reason that desires, or a desire that reasons; and this faculty of originating action constitutes a man.
both divisions of the reason, or both the intellectual faculties have the attainment of truth for their function.
Let us assume that the modes in which the mind arrives at truth in the way of affirmation or negation are five in number:
- art
- science
- prudence
- wisdom
- reason
***The habit or formed faculty of acting with reason or calculation is different from the formed faculty of producing with reason or calculation.
Art may be described as a certain formed faculty of producing with [correct] calculation. And every art is concerned with bringing something into being...and the cause of whose production lies in the producer, not in the thing itself which is produced. [It] is a certain formed faculty or habit of production with correct reasoning or calculation, and the contrary of this is a habit of production with incorrect calculation.
Prudence [is the ability] to deliberate well about what is good or expedient...not with a view to some particular end, but with a view to well-being living well. It can be neither science nor art because the sphere of action is alterable [non-science]; and the production is generically different from action [non-art].
...is a formed faculty that apprehends truth by reasoning or calculation, and issues in action, in the domain of good and ill [good action being in itself the end and not an art].
Temperance preserves prudence...For the principles of practice [for the causes which originate action] are the ends for the sake which acts are done; but wehen a man is corrupted by pleasure or pain, he straightaway loses sight of the principle, and no longer sees that this is the end for the sake of which, and as a means to which, each particular act should be chosen and done; for vice is apt to obliterate the principle.
Prudence will be the virtue of the second/calculative part or the faculty of opinion; for opinion deals with that which is variable, and so does prudence.
Wisdom "sophia" sometimes applied to the domain of the arts to those who are consummate masters of their art. ...the union of [intuitive] reason with demonstrative scientific knowledge, or scientific knowledge of the noblest objects with its crowning perfection. In short, wisdom is the union of the scientific [or demonstrative] knowledge and the [intuitive] reason about objects of the noblest nature.
...both prudence and wisdom must be desirable in themselves, since each is the virtue of one of the parts of the soul, even if neither of the produces anythings.
[but] they do produce something. Wisdom produces happiness in the sense that health produces health.
Now the rightness of purpose is secured by [moral] virtue, but to decide what is proper to be done in order to carry out the purpose belongs not to [moral] virtue, but to another faculty [cleverness]
...there are two forms of calculative faculty (cleverness and prudence) so there are two forms of moral qualities (natural virtue and fully developed virtue) and that the latter is impossible without prudence.
Virtue is not simply a formed habit in accordance with right reason, but a formed habit implying right reason [prudence]
Book VII: Characters other than Virtue and Vice
The undesirable forms of moral character are three: vice, incontinence and brutality.
The opposite of brutal character it would be most appropriate to take that excellence which is beyond us, the excellence of a hero or god.
The continent character...implies that you overcome, and enduring is different than overcoming, just as escaping defeat is different than winning a victory; so continence is better than hardiness. [incontinence is the opposite of these qualities.
The man that is given up to amusement is generally thought to be profligate, but in fact he is soft; for amusement is relaxtion, since it is a rest from labor; and among those who take too much relaxation are those who are given to amusement.
There are two kinds of incontinence: the hasty and the weak...incontinence is genetically different from vice; for the vicious man knows not by the incontinent man knows the nature of his acts.
It is the character of the incontinent man to pursue without being convinced of their goodness, bodily pleasures that exceed the bounds of moderation and are contrary to right reason; but the profligate man is convinved that these things are good becayse it is his character to pursue them.
[in sum] He who abandons any kind of purpose and any kind of reason, or he who abandons a true reason and right purpose [can be called incontinent]. An incontinent man may be compared to a state which always makes excellent decrees and has good laws, but never carries them out. 44
Book VIII: Friendship or Love
Friendship...is a sort of virtue, or at least implies virtue, and is, moreover most necessary to our life.
Moreover, friendship is not only indispensable, but also a beautiful or noble things: for we commend those who love their friends, and to have many friends is thought to be a noble thing; and some even think that a good man is the same as a friend.
Heraclitus: "opposites fit together" & "Out of discordant elements comes the fairest harmony"
One who wishes the good of another is called a well-wisher, when the wish is not reciprocated; when the well wishing is mutual, it is called friendship.
The kinds of friendship accordingly are three, being equal in number to the motives of love; for any of these may be the basis of mutual affection of which each is aware.
Now those who love one another wish each other's good in respect of that which is the motive of their love. Those, therefore, whose love for one another is based on the useful do not love each other for what they are, but only in so far as each gets some good from the other. These friendships are "accidental" for the object of affection is loved, not as being the person or character that he is, but as the source of some good or some pleasure. Host and guest
The perfect kind of friendship is that of good men who resemble on another in virtue. For they both alike wish well to one another as good men, and it is their essential character to be good men. And those who wish well to their friends for the friend's sake are friends in the truest sense; for they have these sentiments towards each other as being what they are, and not in an accidental way; their friendship, lasts as long as their virtue, and that is a lasting thing.
The friendship of good men...is the only one that can defy calumny; for people are not ready to accept the testimony of any one else against him who themselves have tested. Such friendship implies mutual trust, and the certainty that neither would ever wrong the other, and all else that is implied in true friendship; while in other friendships there is no such security.
...when friends living together, they take pleasure in, and do good to each other; when they are aslepp or at a distance from one another, they are not acting as friends, but they have the disposition which, if manifested, issues in friendly acts; for distance does not destroy friendship simply, but the manifestation of friendship.
...friendship is a habit or trained faculty. For inanimate things can equally well be the object of love, but the love of friends for one another implies purpose, and purpose proceeds from a habit or trained faculty.
Book IX: Friendship or Love 2:
In all dissimilar friendships, it is proportionate exchange that maintains equality and preserves the friendship...
...Friendship based on character; being pure is likely to last, as we said.
...for the good man is of one mind with himself, and desires the same things with all his soul, and wishes for himself what both is and seems good, and does that for his own sake (that is for the rational part of him) which seems to be a man's self. And he wishes his self to live and be preserved, and especially that part of his self by which he thinks: existence is good to the good man. But, it is for himself that each wishes the good; no one would choose to have all that is good on condition of being some one else, but only on condition of still being just himself.
Such a man also wishes to live with himself; for his own company is pleasant to him. The memory of his past life is sweet, and for the future he has good hopes; and such hopes are pleasant. His mind is well stored with matter for contemplation: and he sympathizes with himself in sorrow and in joy; for at all seasons the same things give him pain and pleasure, not this thing now, and then another thing, for he is not apt to change his mind.
He who is not good cannot sympathize with himself in joy or sorrow; for his soul is divided against itself: for one part of him, by reason of its viciousness, is pained at being deprived of something, while another part of him is pleased; one part pulls this way, another that way, tearing him to pieces.
...we will all desire existence and love it: but it is in the exercise of our faculties, or in the realizing of ourselves, that our existence lies (in living and doing): but that which a man makes is a realization of his self; therefore he loves it, because he loves existence.
But if happiness consists on living and exercising our faculties; and if the exercise of the good man's faculties is good and pleasant in itself; and if the sense of a thing belongs to us is also a source of pleasure...then the acts of the good men who are his friends are pleasant to the good man. The happy or the blessed man will need such friends, since he desires to contemplate acts that are food and belong to him, and such are the acts of a good man who is his friend.
The good man should be conscious of the existence of his friend also, and this consciousness will be given by the living with him and by rational converse with him.
But the friendship of good men is good and grows with their development; and they seem to become better as they exercise their faculties and correct each other's deficiencies: for each moulds himself to the likeness of that which he approveds in the others; "From good men, thou shalt learn good things."
Book X: Pleasure and Happiness
Pleasure: The exercise of this faculty will be not only the most complete, but also the pleasantest; for the exercise of every sense is attended with pleasure, and so is teh exercise of reason and the speculative faculty; and it is pleasantest when it is most complete, and it is most complete when the faculty is well trained and the object is the best of those that fall under this faculty.
It is evident that the pleasure is greatest when both the faculty and that upon which it is exercised are as good as they can be: when this is the case both with the object of sense and the sentient subject, there will always be pleasure, so long as you have the subject to act and the object to be acted upon.
Now the pleasure makes the exercise complete not as the habit or trained faculty does, being already present in the subject, but as a sort of super-added completeness, like the grace of youth.
The desire for pleasure we should expect to be shared by all men, seeing that all desire to live.
For life is an exercise of faculties, and each man exercises the faculties he most loves upon the things he most loves.
But pleasure completes the exercise of faculties, and therefore life, which men desire.
Naturally, men desire pleasure too; for each man finds in the completion of his life, which is desirable.
Each kind of being seems to have its proper pleasure, as it has its proper function.
In all matters...we hold that things are what they appear to be to the perfect man. Now if this opinion is correct...the test is virtue, or the good man as such---then what appears to him to be pleasure will be pleasure, and what he delights in will be pleasant.
Happiness is not a habit or trained faculty...we must place happiness in some exercise of faculty...happiness lacks nothing: it is sufficient in itself.
Now the exercise of faculty is desirable in itself when nothing is expected from it beyond itself.
Of this nature are held to be: 1) The manifestations of excellence; for what is noble and excellent must be counted desirable in itself: and 2) those amusements which please us: for they are not chosen for the sake of anything else.
Happiness does not consist in amusement; and indeed it is absurd to suppose that the end is amusement.
To be serious and to labor for the sake of amusement seems childish; while to amuse ourselves in order that we may be serious seems to be right; for amusement is a sort of recreation, and we need recreation because we are unable to work continuously.
Recreation cannot be the end; for it is taken as a means to the exercise of our faculties.
Again, the happy life is thought to be that which exhibits virtue; and such a life must be serious and cannot consist in amusement.
But if happiness be the exercise of virtue, it is reasonable to suppose that it will be the exercise of the highest virtue; and that will be the virtue or excellence of the best part of us [Reason].
...of all the virtuous exercises it is allowed that the pleasantest is the exercise of Wisdom. ...Philosophy is thought to have pleasure that are admirable in purity and steadfastness; and it is reasonable to suppose that the time passes more pleasantly with those who possess, than with those who are seeking knowledge.
What is called self-sufficiency [Autarkia] will be most of all found in the speculative life.
If then reason be divine as compared with man, the life which consists in the exercise of reason will also be divine in comparison with human life. ...we ought...make every effort to live in the exercise of the highest of our faculties; for though it be but a small part of us, yet in power and value it far surpasses all the rest.
It is the reason that in the truest sense of man, the life that consists in the exercise of the rason is the best and pleasantest for man---and therefore the happiest.
The true life that consists in the exercise of the other kind of virtue is happy in the secondary sense; for the manifestations of moral virtue or emphatically human.
Moral virtue seems to be a result of physical constitution, and in many points connected with the passions.
Prudence is inseparably joined to moral virtue...since the moral virtues determine the principles of prudence, while prudence determines what is right in morals.
But the moral virtues, being bound up with the passions, must belong to our compound nature; and the virtues of compound nature are emphatically human.
Happiness is a kind of speculation or contemplation.
The man who exercises his reason and cultivates is, and has it in the best condition, seems also to be the most beloved of heaven.
...In practical matters the end is not a mere speculative knowledge of what is to be done, but rather the doing of it. It is not enough to know about virtue, but we must endeavor to possess it and to use it, or to take any other steps that may make us good.
